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SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA
GORDON G. YOUNG*
INTRODUCTION
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court once again split
closely in a case concerning federalism,2 this time confronting issues
of state sovereign immunity.' Seminole is the Court's latest contribu-
tion to what has proved to be a difficult and confusing course of deci-
sions attempting to harmonize the supremacy of federal law with the
states' sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.4 Some such im-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. J.D., New York University
School of Law; LL.M., Harvard University Law School.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4 decision).
2. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550 (1995) (5-4 decision) (holding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (6-3 decision) (concluding that Con-
gress did not have the constitutional power to compel states to provide for the disposal of
radioactive waste generated within their borders); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985) (5-4 decision) (holding that Congress did not exceed
the boundaries of the Commerce Clause in affording mass transit employees the protec-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 (1976) (5-4 decision) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress
to enforce provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act against the states in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4 decision).
3. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1114, 1116, 1119 (splitting 5-4 over issues concerning states'
immunity from suits brought against them in federal court by private individuals).
4. The following is a chronological sequence including most of the main cases prior
to Seminole Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 451-52 (1793) (finding that the
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in a suit filed by a citizen of one state against
another state; the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to change this result, see infra note 7;
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not apply to a writ of error as such a writ was not a "suit" within the meaning of
the Amendment); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824)
(concluding that the Eleventh Amendment was limited to suits in which a state is a party of
record, thus allowing a suit against state officials); Governor of Georgia v. Madrazzo, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 110, 124 (1828) (dismissing a suit against the Governor of Georgia based upon ac-
tions undertaken in his official capacity as a suit against a state under the Eleventh Amend-
ment); Louisiana v.Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1883) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment
barred a suit by Louisiana bondholders seeking to require state officials to honor contrac-
tual obligations to collect a property tax and devote its proceeds to paying state bonds); In
re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887) (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
lower court's enjoining of state officials from bringing suit to recover taxes paid by taxpay-
ers with the interest coupons from state bonds); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529,
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munity-generically referred to below as "state immunity"-may have
existed under the original Constitution,5 or it may have been created,
restored, or augmented by enactment of the Eleventh Amendment6
shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.7
Chisholm denied that a state was immune from a federal court suit
brought against it under state contract law by a citizen of another
530-31 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an individual's suit in
federal court against a county for nonpayment of a debt); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-
21 (1890) (holding that each state possesses immunity from a suit brought against it by one
of its citizens in federal court based on federal law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163-65
(1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit for injunctive relief against
a state official seeking to enforce an unconstitutional act); Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377
U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (5-4 decision) (concluding that Alabama had constructively con-
sented to a federal court negligence action under the Federal Employees Liability Act
brought by an employee of a state-owned railway because Congress, in enacting the Act,
had intended to subject a state to such suits); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974)
(5-4 decision) (finding that a suit against a statewide agency is considered a suit against the
state under the Eleventh Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an award of retroactive retirement benefits
and attorney's fees allowed by Title VII, as the Eleventh Amendment was limited by the
enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (5-4 decision) (concluding the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited federal courts from ordering state officials to conform their con-
duct to state law); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (deciding that Con-
gress has the authority to create a cause of action against a state in federal court for
monetary damages when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause), overruled by Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4 decision). For a good account of these
cases, see RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1041-1105 (4th ed. 1996).
5. This is the majority's position in Seminole. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122, 1127-31.
The dissenters disagreed with this position as a matter of original interpretation of the
document-one of the major differences between the two camps. See id. at 1136-42 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (rejecting an original state sovereign immunity as implicitly required
by the Constitution, but finding that some voluntary judicial restraint to protect states was
acceptable); id. at 1156-58 (Souter,J., dissenting) (same).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. State immunity was "created" by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, if one agrees with the dissenters in Seminole that the Eleventh Amendment created a
limited form of such immunity that had not previously existed. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1136-
37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This immunity was quite limited and provided the states no
protection from suits brought against states to enforce federal law. Id. at 1141. On the
other hand, however, if one agrees with the Seminole majority, the states entered the union
with complete immunity from federal court suits brought by citizens of any state under any
of the Article III jurisdictional grants. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. On this broad view, the
Eleventh Amendment "restored" the small state immunity destroyed by Chisholm's errone-
ous reading of the Constitution, thus augmenting what had remained after that decision.
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130; see also infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
7. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). "A constitutional amendment to overrule Chisholm
was introduced in the Senate only two days after the decision" in Chisholm was announced.
FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1048.
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state.' In response to Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment9 was en-
acted five years later.'
°
I will discuss in greater detail the multiplicity of judicial and
scholarly views as to the meaning of this Amendment-protecting a
state from suits brought by citizens of other states. I will also discuss the
existence of an additional form of immunity protecting a state from
suits brought by its own citizens. Although this additional and contro-
versial immunity obviously is not traceable to the words of the Elev-
enth Amendment, the Supreme Court first recognized it in Hans v.
Louisiana," and a majority of the Court continues to recognize it.' 2
The Court's frequent shorthand references to both bodies of state im-
munity-Eleventh Amendment immunity and Hans immunity-as
"Eleventh Amendment immunity""3 have created some confusion.
Seminole offers a clearer, if controversial, explanation for Hans's
extratextual immunity by concluding that the original Constitution
implicitly contemplated that states were generally to be free of all pri-
vate suits in federal court, whether brought against a state by its own
8. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451-52 (Opinion of Blair, J.). The Justices in Chisholm
delivered their opinions seriatim.
9. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI (emphasis added).
10. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1048.
11. 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890) (holding that each state possesses immunity from a suit
brought by one of its citizens in federal court). When referring to this second sort of state
immunity separately, the words "Hans immunity" will be used for clarity.
12. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (5-4 decision) (stating that
each state is a sovereign entity and may not be sued by an individual without the state's
consent).
13. While careful reading of most Supreme Court opinions on the subject makes clear
that Hans immunity is not based on the Eleventh Amendment, a casual reader could easily
be confused by isolated passages: "Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court held that the
Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own State in federal court,
even though the express terms of the [Eleventh] Amendment do not so provide." Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). "Whether Illinois permits such a
suit to be brought against the State in its own courts is not determinative of whether Illi-
nois has relinquished its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts."
Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). That Edelman more properly involved Hans
immunity and not Eleventh Amendment immunity is evident from the fact that Edelman
was not a suit against a state by citizens of different states, as the Amendment specifies, but
was a suit against Illinois by its own citizen-welfare recipients. This seems implicit in the
Supreme Court opinion in Edelman, but is even clearer in the opinion of the court below.
SeeJordan v. Edelman, 472 F.2d 985, 990 (7th Cir. 1973).
Passages in Hans itself can easily be mistaken as statements that a state's immunity
from suits by its own citizens comes from the Amendment, see, e.g., Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-12,
although a more careful reading would convince otherwise. See infra note 92.
14131997]
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citizens or by citizens of other states.14 The Eleventh Amendment, on
this view, simply restored the part of this original immunity that the
Supreme Court erroneously rejected in Chisholm-that barring suits
by citizens of other states-so that after its passage, states were once
again exempt from federal suits brought by citizens of any state.1
5
Seminole would be merely interesting if it just offered the first rea-
sonably clear and official explanation of the existence of Hans immu-
nity. Of real concern is Seminole's expansion of both sorts of state
immunity. One of the two major sections of the Seminole majority
opinion imposes reasonably clear and significant limits on Congress's
previously recognized power to eliminate both sorts of state immu-
nity.16 In the other major section, the majority may well have started
the process of limiting another longstanding doctrine that denies the
protections of state immunity to certain suits brought against state of-
ficers to enforce federal law. I v
The first of these two doctrines, which Seminole clearly limits, is
that of abrogation-the power of Congress to override state immunity
in order to subject a state to suit in federal court. Abrogation was first
recognized in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.'8 In that case, the Supreme Court
first found that Congress possessed the power to abrogate state immu-
nity pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.19  Fitzpatrick suggests that the powerful policies of the
Fourteenth Amendment repeal any earlier constitutional immunities
posing a threat to realization of the aims of this Reconstruction
Amendment.20 The reasoning of Fitzpatrick suggests the possibility
that other amendments enacted after the original Constitution and
the Eleventh Amendment-particularly the Thirteenth and the Fif-
14. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122, 1129-31.
15. See id. (discussing this original understanding of the Eleventh Amendment).
16. Id. at 1123-32 (limiting, in Part II of the majority opinion, Congress's power to
abrogate state immunity); see infra Part II.B.
17. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33 (rejecting, in Part III of the majority opinion, suit
against a state officer under the doctrine of ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see infra
Part II.C.
18. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
19. Id. at 456 ("Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or State officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other con-
texts." (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945))).
20. Id. at 455-56. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Fitzpatrick was based on the timing and
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly Section 5, explicitly granting Con-
gress the power to enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation. Id. at 456. The
emphasis was on how the Amendment was designed to alter the pre-existing balance of
federalism. Id. at 454-55.
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teenth Amendments-also permit congressional abrogation. 2 1 Fitzpat-
ick's logic seemed limited to congressional powers created after the
original Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment-powers that
plausibly permit an override of any state immunity contained in those
earlier sources of law. 2 2 In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,23 however, a
majority of the Court permitted Congress to abrogate state immunity
under part of the original Constitution-the Interstate Commerce
Clause 24 -thereby subjecting states to certain private-party damages
suits in federal court.
25
Seminole's clearest and most striking effect is to overrule Union
Gas.26 This restores the case law to a position prohibiting Commerce
Clause-based abrogation,27 a position widely criticized by academic
writers in the years before Union Gas allowed such abrogation.28 Semi-
nole's restoration of the earlier widely criticized view has important
real-world consequences. For example, the Seminole view precludes
Congress from subjecting states to private lawsuits under environmen-
tal laws such as Superfund.29
Seminole's effect on another limitation of state immunity-the
nearly century-old doctrine identified with Ex parte Young 3°-is less
21. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments re-
flect powerful post-Eleventh Amendment policies, designed to change the balance of fed-
eralism, and contain similar provisions that permit congressional enforcement by
appropriate legislation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4
decision).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
commerce . . . among the several States ... .
25. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
26. Seminole, 116 U.S. at 1128 ("We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly
decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.").
27. Id.
28. During the decade preceding Union Gas, many distinguished academics endorsed
the broader position that state immunity had no application to suits brought to enforce
federal law. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 549 (1977) (opining that the Eleventh Amend-
ment should not stop Congress from imposing suit upon states); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889,
2004 (1983) (stating that the Supreme Court should find "that Congress can eliminate
state immunity with respect to any subject on which it has legislative authority").
29. The Court in Union Gas held that Congress, in enacting the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), intended to hold
states liable in a federal court for damages, and further held that Congress had the author-
ity to create such a cause of action. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
30. 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
federal suits to enjoin state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional state law).
1997] 1415
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clear than its effect on Congress's power of abrogation. The Ex parte
Young limit on state immunity, unlike abrogation, is an internal one.
It places certain suits outside the definition of suits against states and,
thus, outside the protection of state immunity.3' This class of suits,
which seek to compel state officers prospectively to abide by federal
law, are maintainable in federal court.32 The Ex parte Young doctrine
is widely regarded as a legal fiction because the suits it excludes from
state immunity often are, from any realistic perspective, suits against
states. 33 These are suits aimed at thwarting official enforcement of
state policy made by legitimate state organs of government.34
It is this second part of the Seminole opinion concerning the Ex
parte Young doctrine35 that causes the most concern and, therefore,
will receive the most attention below. In that portion of its opinion,
the majority limits Ex parte Young in ways that are difficult to under-
stand.36 The formulaic language of the majority opinion discussing Ex
parte Young seems relatively tame because, on the surface, it appears
only to deny injunctive suits against state officers for violation of those
federal statutes that Congress itself intended not be enforced by such
a suit.3
7
The circumstances of Seminole, however, make the majority opin-
ion seem ominous. As discussed below, the implausible lengths to
which the majority went in finding congressional intent to forbid in-
junctive enforcement suggest that the Court might be moving toward
allowing Ex parte Young suits to enforce federal statutes only to the
extent that the statutes expressly provide for such enforcement.38
Most likely, the end point of such a movement would fall short of a
clear statement requirement, but would reflect a greatly increased
31. Id. at 167 (stating that, when a state official seeks to enforce a state law violative of
the Federal Constitution, "[t]he sovereignty of the State is, in reality, no[t] involved").
32. Id. at 168.
33. See, e.g., PETER W. Low & JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 887 (3d ed. 1994) (characterizing Ex parteYoung as "rest[ing]
on a fictional tour de force").
34. By contrast, suits seeking to compel a state to pay reparations from its treasury for a
past wrong, whether formally against states as named parties or against state officers, are
within state immunity and cannot be maintained in federal court. See Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663, 666-71 (1974) (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n,
327 U.S. 573 (1946); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)).
35. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996) (5-4 decision).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1132 ("Nevertheless, we think that ... where Congress has prescribed a de-
tailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a
court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action
against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young.").
38. See infta notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
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willingness to find implied congressional preclusion of injunctive
relief.
The opinions and the split among the Justices in Seminole are rem-
iniscent of the Court's uneven course regarding possible Tenth
Amendment limits on Congress's powers to regulate the states under
the Commerce Clause. In those cases, the Court first found few, if
any, limits. 9 Then it reversed course, finding special protection for
states. 40 Next it changed direction again, suggesting that no, or al-
most no, limits exist beyond the practical ones imposed by virtue of
the states' representation in Congress.41 Most recently, in New York v.
United States,42 the Court changed its view again, finding that the
Tenth Amendment does indeed limit what Congress can do directly to
states using its commerce powers.43
Like Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, and at
least arguably New York v. United States, Seminole overrules by a narrow
margin a recent case, itself decided by a narrow majority.4 4 Seminole
also reverberates with United States v. Lopez,45 which pertained to a
closely related strand of federalism-the general limits on Congress's
regulatory powers, whether aimed at states or private individuals. For
the first time in nearly half a century, Lopez enforced a limit on con-
gressional power to regulate private activities under the Interstate
Commerce Clause and began to define a sphere in which state regula-
39. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1968) ("[The Court] will not carve up
the commerce power to protect enterprises... simply because those enterprises happen to
be run by the States for the benefit of their citizens."), overruled by National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4 decision).
40. See National League, 426 U.S. at 852 (holding that the Commerce Clause did not
give Congress the power "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions").
41. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57 (holding that the basic limits on the federal com-
merce power are those restraints that are inherent in all congressional action and are pro-
vided for through state participation in federal governmental action).
42. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
43. Id. at 178 ("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate."). Admit-
tedly, New York v. United States is ambiguous, as it remains to be seen whether the special
Tenth Amendment protections that it recognizes for states are large or limited.
44. Id. at 177 (finding a violation of the Tenth Amendment seven years after Garcia, a
5-4 decision, suggested strongly that the political process rather than judicial review should
provide the safeguard for the states). Seminole's 5-4 vote overruled Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which the Court also split 5-4. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996) (5-4 decision); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
45. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (5-4 decision).
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tory powers are exclusive. 46 As with the Garcia-New York v. United States
line of cases and Lopez, the stakes of federalism in Seminole seem high
to the Justices. Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Seminole is one of
the longest in recent decades.
47
Part I of this Comment describes the statutory scheme that gave
rise to the Seminole case, as well as the events of the case itself. Part
II.A is a brief description of the history and current status of the two
sorts of sovereign immunity-Eleventh Amendment immunity and
Hans immunity-that the Supreme Court recognizes as protecting the
states from most federal court suits brought against them by private
parties. It is written primarily for those who lack a firm grounding in
these extremely complicated doctrines. Parts II.B and C speculate
about the heart of Seminole, which is its limitation of two exceptions to
both sorts of state immunity. Part II.B addresses the implications of
Seminole's new limits on Congress's power to abrogate state immunity.
Part II.C addresses Seminole's possible limitation of the doctrine of Ex
parte Young, which views certain suits against state officers as outside
the protection of state immunity.
I. THE CASE
The issues of judicial federalism that were raised, and to some
degree resolved, in Seminole arose from the necessity of interpreting
and determining the constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act (the Gaming Act),48 passed in 1988. The Gaming Act prohib-
ited Indian tribes from conducting certain gambling operations
unless they met a number of requirements.4" Among these was the
requirement that a compact between the state and the tribe authorize
the operations.50
46. Id. at 563-64 (rejecting the Government's argument that Congress can regulate all
activities that might portend violent crime, and rejecting a similar argument that Congress
could regulate any activity it found related to individual economic productivity).
47. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1145-85 (Souter, J., dissenting) (encompassing forty pages in
the Supreme Court Reporter).
48. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
49. Id. § 2710(d)(1). This provision states:
(1) Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities
are-(A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that-(i) is adopted by the
governing body of the Indian Tribe having jurisdiction over such lands, (ii) meets
the requirements of subsection (b) of this Section, and (iii) is approved by the
Chairman, (B) located in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity, and (C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-
State compact entered into by the Indian Tribe and the State under paragraph
(3) that is in effect.
Id.
50. Id. § 2710(d) (3).
1418 [VOL. 56:1411
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The law required states, at a tribe's request, to negotiate the
terms of such a compact in good faith.51 If negotiations failed to oc-
cur for 180 days after the tribe's request, the Gaming Act provided
that a tribe could bring a federal court action against the state to com-
pel negotiation and conclusion of a compact.52 In such an action, the
burden was on the state to prove that it negotiated in good faith.5" If
the state failed to meet this burden, the statute required the district
court to order conclusion of a compact within sixty days.54
The Seminole Tribe of Florida (the Tribe) brought such a suit
against the State of Florida and its governor, after the latter had flatly
refused negotiations. The State argued that Congress could not
constitutionally abrogate its immunity with a statute grounded in the
Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause.56 The federal district court
rejected this argument, and Florida took an interlocutory appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which
reversed on the narrow ground that Congress possesses no power of
abrogation under the Indian Commerce Clause.57 The court of ap-
peals also rejected the Tribe's alternative argument. This was that,
after dismissal of the State as a named party, the suit could go forward
as an Ex parte Young suit compelling a state officer (the governor) to
comply prospectively with federal law.58
The Supreme Court granted certiorari59 to resolve the following
two issues:
(1) Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress
from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for pro-
spective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pur-
suant to the Indian Commerce Clause?; and
51. Id. § 2710(d) (3) (A).
52. Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i) and (B)(i).
53. Id. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (ii).
54. Id. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iii). On failure of these negotiations, the statute provided that
the tribe and the state each submit a proposed compact to a federal court-appointed medi-
ator who would then select the best of the two according to vaguely specified criteria. Id.
§ 2710(d) (7) (B) (iv).
55. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1996) (5-4 decision).
56. Id. at 1126.
57. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996) (5-4 decision).
58. Id. at 1028-29.
59. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
1997] 1419
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(2) Does the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit suits
against a State's governor for prospective injunctive relief to en-
force the good faith bargaining requirement of the Act?6 °
The Court answered both questions in favor of state immunity.61
It answered the first in the affirmative, finding no congressional
power to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause,62 and holding
that the more significant Interstate Commerce Clause likewise pro-
vides no such power.63 It answered the second in the negative, disal-
lowing the suit under Ex parte Young.6 4
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE OPINIONS AND AT WHERE Seminole
May Lead
The Seminole Court, splitting 5-4, displays the essentially bipolar
division on issues of federalism typical of the Court in recent years.65
Nevertheless, Seminole produced none of the fragmentation within the
Court's various ideological camps that is typical in such cases.66 The
clarity of the alignment and positions of the Justices is unusual. The
60. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (emphasis added). Note again that under state immu-
nity, as explicated by the Court, suits against states as named parties are forbidden, regard-
less of relief sought, unless immunity was appropriately abrogated. See Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663, 672 (1974) (5-4 decision). On the other hand, suits against states of-
ficers, in which the state is not a named party, were a more complicated matter. The latter
were treated as suits against the state if they, in effect, sought damages for past wrongs, but
as not against the state if they sought only prospective compliance with federal law. See Ex
parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-50 (1908).
61. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
62. Id. at 1122, 1126-28, 1131.
63. The Seminole Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
which had permitted abrogation under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Seminole, 116 S.
Ct. at 1126-28, 1131; see also id. at 1131-32 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts thejudicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
64. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
65. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
66. For example, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (5-4 decision), Chief
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, but five additional opinions were
filed. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connorjoined. Id. at
568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas filed a separate concurring opinion. Id.
at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions,
id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603-15 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at
615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Similarly, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (5-4 decision), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (5-4 decision), then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, id. at
835-56, and Justice Blackmun wrote a concurrence. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Marshall joined, id.
at 856-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice wrote an opinion of the Court for himself and four of
the associate Justices.6 7 The majority opinion clearly rejects, if not al-
ways for clear reasons, both the abrogation and Ex parte Youngjustifi-
cations for the Tribe's suit.6" Seminole produced no concurring
opinions. Justice Souter's dissent, in favor of the Tribe's suit, both on
abrogation and Ex parte Young grounds, was formally joined by justices
Ginsburg and Breyer.69 Justice Stevens concurred de facto in Justice
Souter's dissent,7" but dissented separately to offer further arguments
of his own. 7 ' Two gauges of the high stakes involved and potential
bitterness among the Justices are the breathtaking length of Justice
Souter's opinion, and his unusual and dramatic reading of portions of
it from the bench. v2
A. The Opinions and the Sources and Scope of State Immunity
1. Some Background.-To understand the significance of Semi-
nole, it is important to recognize the origin and nature of the state
immunity that it clarified and then limited. This matter involves two
sources of immunity. One of these-Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity-is based on text, and its existence is uncontroversial, although
its scope is a matter of dispute.7" The other is Hans immunity, which a
majority of the current Court controversially alleges to have been im-
plicitly a part of the original Constitution. 4 Each of these immunities
is subject to a variety of interpretations as to their scope and as to the
possibility of congressional override.
67. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Id.
68. Id. at 1133.
69. Id. at 1145-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1145 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("For these reasons, as well as those set forth in
Justice S[outer]'s opinion, I respectfully dissent.").
71. Id. at 1133-45.
72. See David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal Lawsuits Against the States, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 5254981 ("In a rare occurrence, Justice David H.
Souter read parts of his dissent from the bench. In written form, it ran to 92 pages.").
"Perhaps the [set of opinions] of greatest length in the history of the Court is Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)." Ray Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions-Style and Substance: An
Appeal for Reform, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 176 (1995). As downloaded from LEXIS, all of the
opinions in Buckley taken together are 197 pages; those in Seminole are 95 pages. The main
opinion in Buckley, the per curiam opinion, however, is 135 pages, or roughly 45,500 words,
according to the WordPerfect 6.1 wordcount process. By itself, Justice Souter's dissent in
Seminole, at 105 pages and roughly 32,500 words, is slightly over seventy percent of the
Buckley per curiam opinion.
73. See infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
74. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130.
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Some Justices have found the applicability of state immunity de-
pendent on the Article III jurisdictional grant upon which suit is
sought to be maintained against the state-whether suit is sought to
be maintained in federal court based on the assertion of a federal
cause of action against the state, or whether federal jurisdiction is
based solely on the plaintiff's citizenship in another state or in a for-
eign nation.75 Conversely, some Justices view state immunity as appli-
cable to suits brought under any federal jurisdictional grant.76
Similarly, the legitimacy of congressional abrogation may depend
upon the particular power that Congress invokes in creating a private
cause of action against states.77 These views can and have appeared in
a bewildering variety of permutations. I deal below with the major
permutations identified with the various Seminole opinions. 78 Because
the distinctions are subtle, I have provided a summary chart at the end
of this section to assist those unfamiliar with doctrines of state
immunity.
Chisholm v. Georgia79 was a contract action brought in federal
court by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia.8"
The plaintiff attempted to ground federal jurisdiction upon that por-
tion of Article III, Section 281 that grants federal jurisdiction in "Con-
troversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State. ' 2 The
Court found that federal jurisdiction did indeed exist, despite Geor-
75. Id. at 1136-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity applies only to certain diversity suits and not to suits brought to enforce federal laws);
id. at 1146, 1150 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reaching the same conclusion).
76. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 ("[F]ederal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting
States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of
the United States.'" (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890))).
77. See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text; see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32
(stating that Article I cannot be used to avoid constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction).
78. See infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
79. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
80. Id. at 419 (statement of plaintiff's counsel).
81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This provision states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Contro-
versies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
82. Article III, Section 2, Clause I provides for federal court jurisdiction in only nine
categories of cases. Id. These include not only the familiar jurisdictional grants for cases
involving federal questions and the diverse state citizenship of private parties, but also
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gia's argument that the grant implicitly recognized state sovereign im-
munity and was most properly read as allowing jurisdiction only in
suits by states as plaintiffs against citizens of other states . 3
The Eleventh Amendment's narrow focus as a response to
Chisholm is inferable not only from its timing," but also from its
language:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State. 85
This language closely tracks those provisions of Article III that seem to
grant federal courts jurisdiction of suits against states solely because
they are sued by citizens of other states or by foreign citizens.86 Thus,
the Eleventh Amendment seems aimed at limiting those particular
grants of Article III and not at limiting the grant that allows federal
court suits arising under federal law, which presumably remains avail-
able even when a state is a party-defendant.
Despite the Amendment's language, in 1890 the Court held, in
Hans v. Louisiana,8" that a federal cause of action brought against Lou-
isiana by one of its own citizens fell within state sovereign immunity.88
This holding is problematic for two reasons. First, and most obviously,
the words of the Amendment specifically bar suits brought against a
state by citizens of other states, not suits brought against a state by its own
citizens.89 Second, if the Eleventh Amendment merely amends the
Article III jurisdictional grants that formerly permitted suits between
states and citizens of other states or foreign citizens, it would seem to
leave untouched suits of any sort brought under the other jurisdic-
tional grants in Article III. Most particularly, the Amendment seems
to leave untouched federal question suits (such as Hans itself) in
seven more obscure grants. Id. Among these seven is a grant permitting federal courts to
hear "[C]ontroversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State." Id.
83. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469 (Opinion of Cushing, J.).
84. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
85. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
86. In relevant part, Article III reads: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity... between a State and Citizens of another State... and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
Another portion extends the judicial power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States." Id.
87. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
88. Id. at 14-15.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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which the Constitution permitted federal jurisdiction based on the
presence of federal issues in the case, regardless of the nature or citi-
zenship of the parties."° On this view, even if the plaintiff in Hans had
been a citizen of another state, his federal question action against
Louisiana could have proceeded in federal court unimpeded by the
Eleventh Amendment.
2. Seminole's View of the Sources and Scope of State Immunity.-The
majority opinion in Seminole clarifies Hans. At times, the Hans opinion
implausibly suggests that the Eleventh Amendment compelled the
Court's result.9" At other times the opinion suggests an alternative,
more intelligible view based on the notion that the original, un-
amended Constitution implicitly guaranteed the states immunity from
federal court suits brought against them by the citizens of any state.2
This alternative reading of Hans is the one endorsed by the Seminole
majority,9" and it rests upon two crucial premises. First, the Seminole
Court perceives the Eleventh Amendment as merely a correction of
Chisholm's mistaken view that the Constitution permits federal courts
to hear suits against states brought by citizens of other states.94 Second,
because no similar mistake had destroyed the original, implicit immu-
nity protecting a state against any federal suit brought by its own citi-
zens, that immunity continued to exist without need of support from a
constitutional amendment.95 Thus, the Seminole majority believes that
the Constitution's original, implicit state immunity prohibited citizens
of any state from bringing any federal court suit against a state.96 The
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-12 (relying heavily on the Amendment's text).
92. A more careful reading of the passages in Hans suggests that the immunity recog-
nized was based on an original constitutional understanding that states are generally not
suable in federal court by their own citizens or those of other states: "The truth is, that the
cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States." Id. at 10.
93. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (5-4 decision) ("For over a
century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States
Iwas not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States."' (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15)).
94. Id. at 1130 ("[W]e long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the
Eleventh Amendment is '"to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of."' The text dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the
decision in Chisholm. . . ." (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 326 (1934) (quot-
ing Hans, 134 U.S. at 15) (citation omitted))).
95. Id. at 1122; see also supra note 91.
96. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-31. The Court stated:
"[N] either the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of § 2 of Article III
[permitting Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction over suits arising under
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majority thus believes that, excepting a brief interlude between
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment, this sweeping immunity has
continued to this day.
9 7
The Seminole dissenters have a different view of state immunity,
particularly regarding its status as an unyielding constitutional protec-
tion that is untouchable by Congress. The dissenters posit that a
proper understanding of the original Constitution leads to the conclu-
sion that a state had no immunity from suits in federal court brought
by a citizen of any state to enforce federal law.98 Although all of the
dissenters reject the majority's recognition of an implicit constitu-
tional immunity that yields to no congressional action,9 they are will-
ing to accept the existence of a federal common law immunity that
can be removed by express statutory language indicating Congress's
intent to create a federal action against the states.'00 This view seems
to represent a compromise with stare decisis-a reasonable way to rec-
oncile the dissenters' view of federalism with Hans and other cases
that indisputably recognized some type of state immunity extending
beyond that conferred by the Eleventh Amendment. Although the
majority sees such extratextual immunity as an unconditional guaran-
tee to the states, the dissenters see it as a court-made prudential doc-
federal law], nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, permits the conclusion that in all controversies of the sort described in
Clause one, and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may
be sued without her consent."
Id. at 1129 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934) (first alteration in
original)). The Court noted that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress com-
plete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents con-
gressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States." Id. at
1131.
97. Id. at 1131.
98. See, e.g., id. at 1150 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1151 (stating that the
Eleventh Amendment had no effect on federal question jurisdiction (citing Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 6 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821))). Justice Souter also concluded that Hans did not
prohibit Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity in federal question suits. Id.
at 1153-59.
99. See id. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There can be no serious debate, however,
over whether Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought
by a citizen of the State being sued. Congress' authority in that regard is clear."); id. at
1146 (SouterJ., dissenting) (stating that the majority's decision that state sovereign immu-
nity may not be abrogated by Congress is directly at odds with the view that the common
law was always subject to legislative amendment).
100. See id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No one has ever suggested that Congress
would be powerless to displace the other common-law immunity doctrines that this Court
has recognized as appropriate defenses to certain federal claims .... ."); id. at 1173 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (expressing a willingness to recognize a congressionally displaceable, not
constitutionally required, immunity that federal courts accord states as a matter of comity).
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trine.10 1 For the dissenters, Hans immunity is not based on the text of
the Eleventh Amendment or on any constitutional requirement. It is
based on the Supreme Court's choice to decline jurisdiction in the
interest of federalism, a judicial choice similar to that underlying the
abstention doctrines.
10 2
Beyond their differences as to the existence of an implied, origi-
nal, and absolute constitutional bar to federal suits against states by
citizens of any state, the Seminole majority and the dissenters differ as
to the meaning and scope of the one explicit source of state immu-
nity-the Eleventh Amendment. For the majority, the Eleventh
Amendment restores the original, absolute immunity from federal
suits brought against states by citizens of other states, after Chisholm
had destroyed such immunity by misreading the Constitution. 0 3 In
the majority's view, such original immunity extended to all federal
suits, including those brought to enforce federal law. Thus, the im-
munity that the Eleventh Amendment restored also extends to federal
question suits.104 The Seminole dissenters have a dramatically different
view. They conclude that the Eleventh Amendment imposes no limi-
tation on federal question jurisdiction because its language and his-
tory show that its sole aim was to bar diversity suits against the
states.10 5 These are suits involving state law, such as Chisholm, brought
against states under the clause of the Constitution that appears to al-
low federal jurisdiction over any suit between a state and citizens of
other states. 106
The great complexity of the immunity addressed in Seminole is
attributable to a wide variety of possible views, each of which is a per-
mutation created by the interplay of two possibly overlapping sources
of immunity. In turn, the scope and nature of each part of immunity
law is subject to varying interpretations. The chart below summarizes
the views of the majority and those of the dissenters in Seminole.
101. See id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1173 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1173 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130 ("[T]he decision in Chisholmwas contrary to the well-
understood meaning of the Constitution.").
104. See id. at 1129 ("[A] Ithough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is . . .against a State,
without her consent, by one of her own citizens." (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 242 U.S.
313, 322 (1934))); see also id. at 1131-32 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III . . ").
105. See, e.g., id. at 1150 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("The history and structure of the Elev-
enth Amendment convincingly show that it reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdic-
tion exclusively under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses.").
106. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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FEDERAL COURT SUITS BARRED
Citizens of State Citizens of State
IN THE VIEW Citizens of State A Citizens of State A Sue State B A Sue State A
OF WHICH Sue State B A Sue State A Under Federal Under Federal
JUSTICES Under State Law Under State Law Law Law
Majority Barred- Barred- Barred- Barred-
Originally barred by implicit Originally barred by implicit
by implicit constitutional by implicit constitutional
constitutional immunity, which constitutional immunity, which
immunity, which exists to this day, immunity, which exists to this day,
was rejected in never impaired was rejected in never impaired
Chisholm, but by judicial Chisholm, but by judicial
restored by the decision. restored by the decision.
Eleventh Congress cannot Eleventh Congress cannot
Amendment. lift bar. 10 8  Amendment. lift bar except
Congress cannot Congress cannot when it acts
lift bar.10 7  lift bar except under the
when it acts Fourteenth
under the Amendment and
Fourteenth possibly other
Amendment and Reconstruction
possibly other Amendments.
l l O
Reconstruction
Amendments. 1 0 9
FEDERAL COURT SUITS BARRED
Citizens of State Citizens of State
IN THE VIEW Citizens of State A Citizens of State A Sue State B A Sue State A
OF WHICH Sue State B A Sue State A Under Federal Under Federal
JUSTICES Under State Law Under State Law Law Law
Dissenters Barred by the Not barred by Not barred by Not barred by
Eleventh immunity Eleventh Eleventh
Amendment. because Eleventh Amendment. Amendment, for
Congress cannot Amendment But barred by two separate
lift bar.1 1 1  does not address federal common reasons. First,
suits against a law immunity the Amendment
state by its own unless Congress is seen as not
citizens. Unlikely expressly applicable to
to be cognizable overrides under federal question
in federal court any of its suits. Second,
under any Article legislative the Amendment
107. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 18-29, 103-104 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 18-29, 94-97 and accompanying text.
111. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1146 (1996) (5-4 decision) (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment soon changed the result in
[Chisholm] . . . ."); see also id. at 1136 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment's jurisdictional restriction is best understood to apply only to suits premised
on diversity jurisdiction ....").
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FEDERAL COURT SUITS BARRED
Citizens of State Citizens of State
IN THE VIEW Citizens of State A Citizens of State A Sue State B A Sue State A
OF WHICH Sue State B A Sue State A Under Federal Under Federal
JUSTICES Under State Law Under State Law Law Law
III jurisdictional powers. 113 is not applicable
grant, because it to suits against a
is neither a state by its own
diversity suit nor citizens. But
a federal barred by federal
question suit.1 1 2  common law
immunity unless
Congress
expressly
overrides. 1 1 4
B. The Significance of Seminole's View of Abrogation
Seminole's narrowest holding is that the Indian Commerce Clause
does not permit Congress to abrogate state immunity. 1 15 Although
some advocates unsuccessfully have attempted to limit Seminole's hold-
ing in this way,116 the case simply cannot be read so narrowly. The
Seminole majority concluded that, "[i]f anything, the Indian Com-
merce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States
to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce
Clause." '117 The majority did not shrink from announcing the implica-
tions of this conclusion: If the Indian Commerce Clause is at least as
potent than the Interstate Commerce Clause, yet does not permit ab-
rogation, then Union Gas must have been wrong in its conclusion that
the latter empowered Congress to write abrogating legislation.' 18 Lest
there be any doubt, the Court stated: "We feel bound to conclude
that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is,
overruled."1 9
112. See id. at 1156 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is
not applicable in a suit brought against a state by its own citizen); see also supra notes 98-105
and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
115. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126-28, 1131 (finding no distinction between the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause, and overruling Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which allowed Congress to abrogate state immunity
under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
116. See, e.g., Chauvin v. Louisiana, 937 F. Supp. 567, 567-68 (E.D. La. 1996) (rejecting
plaintiff's attempt to so limit Seminole's abrogation holding).
117. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126.
118. Id. at 1126-28.
119. Id. at 1128.
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Is the Seminole majority right? My sympathies are with the posi-
tion of Justice Souter's dissenting opinion and the vast majority of
commentators that a federal cause of action trumps state immunity.120
For others, the answer will depend both on their theory of constitu-
tional interpretation and on the facts of federalism, historical and cur-
rent, made relevant by that interpretive view. The majority Justices'
views as to these matters are unlikely to change in ways affecting state
immunity jurisprudence, although appointment of new Justices may
make the Seminole dissent the view of a future majority in a pattern
reminiscent of the Court's wildly swinging Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.1 2 1
Instead of entering the debate on the correctness of the major-
ity's view of original state immunity, I want to engage in some specula-
tion as to the future. I want to consider where Seminole might lead.
First, might the abrogation holding be at least slightly narrower than it
appears? Is it possible that the Seminole majority might find that some
provisions of the original Constitution-other than the Indian and
Interstate Commerce Clauses-support legislation abrogating state
immunity? For example, might the Foreign Commerce Clause be
seen as sufficiently more potent than the Interstate Commerce Clause,
and even the Indian Commerce Clause, 122 to permit Congress to cre-
ate causes of action against the states and in favor of private parties,
thus abrogating state immunity? Although nothing in the Seminole ma-
jority opinion clearly rules out this possibility, the Court's distinction
of Fourteenth Amendment abrogation stresses both the potency of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the changes wrought in American
federalism after the Civil War.' 23 In short, the majority seems to be-
lieve that, under the original Constitution, state immunity trumped all
arguable congressional powers that might have permitted suits against
states in federal court. 12 4
Of more interest are possibilities that Seminole might be broader
than it seems. First, could it be the initial step in a series of decisions
limiting Congress's abrogation power? Although it does not seem ut-
120. Id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a list of articles discussing the source and
scope of sovereign immunity under the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment, see id.
at 1150 n.8.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [to] regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
. . . .11).
123. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125, 1128 (discussing the rationale for abrogation under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
124. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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terly irrational to worry about whether Congress's power to abrogate
state immunity under its power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amend-
ment will be the next domino to fall, this seems unlikely even if the
Court's composition remains the same. Nothing in the opinion gives
that impression. It is worth noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
wrote the majority opinion in Seminole,125 also wrote the opinion in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,1 26 which established the legitimacy of congressional
abrogation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 In Sem-
inole, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion offers not the slightest hint of
a forthcoming retrenchment regarding Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment powers. Indeed, the Court takes great care to explain
why the rationale it believes supports Fourteenth Amendment abroga-
tion simply is not available in cases of abrogation under provisions of
the original Constitution. 12' This explanation is entirely consistent
with the reasoning of Fitzpatrick itself, which rested on arguments that
the Fourteenth Amendment was special in timing and substance. 129
A more interesting possibility is that the narrow limitation of Con-
gress's abrogation powers will force a showdown on other Eleventh
Amendment issues and, indeed, on related Tenth Amendment 3 ° is-
sues of state immunity from congressional regulation. Congress may
attempt to accomplish through state waiver of sovereign immunity
what it cannot through abrogation. Early cases explained that, while
state immunity deprives a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction,
an immunity defense is unusual because it can be waived by the state,
unlike the great mass of defects in subject matter jurisdiction.13 1 In
some cases, courts found implied waiver of state immunity against fed-
eral court suits connected with a federal program or regulatory
scheme because of what the courts perceived as the state's voluntary
entanglement with the program or scheme. 132 As the Court devel-
125. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119, 1126-28.
126. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
127. Id. at 447, 456.
128. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 ("Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplica-
ble to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth Amendment... operated
to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III
and the Eleventh Amendment." (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S at 454)).
129. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453-56.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
131. See, e.g., Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (stating
that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a privilege that can be waived); Clark v. Barnard,
108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (holding that voluntary appearance by state waived immunity).
132. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (5-4 decision), overruled by
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (5-4 decision),
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oped its abrogation jurisprudence, it seems to have shied away from
constructive waivers, which are simply abrogation with a different la-
bel.' Actual but implied waivers may now be impossible due to a
clear statement requirement similar to that for abrogation.'34
Nonetheless, nothing in the implied waiver or abrogation cases
addresses limits on express waivers induced by federal pressure. After
Seminole, Congress cannot wield abrogation as a tool over most of its
regulatory domain; so it will certainly try to induce a valid state waiver
if and when it wishes to subject states to federal court actions establish-
ing substantive federal liability to private persons. This tactic raises an
Eleventh Amendment aspect of what will likely become a pivotal issue
in the current struggle over American federalism: Which constitu-
tional protections may states waive, and how is the validity of such a
waiver tested? In New York v. United States,135 Justice O'Connor made
clear that which could never be doubted: Some of the Constitution's
structural protections for states cannot be waived.'3 6 Determining
which limits the states may bargain away, and to what degree, is a vast
and serious scholarly enterprise far beyond the scope of this
Comment.
Still, it is worth noting that such waiver issues generally may be
the next situs of the struggle over federalism. If United States v. Lo-
peZ137 is the beginning of a serious attempt to limit federal regulatory
power, any such limits are nearly worthless without concomitant limits
on the alternative forms in which regulatory desires may express
limited by Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991). In Parden, the
Court held that the State of Alabama had impliedly consented to federal court jurisdiction
by participating in the railroad industry. The finding of an implied waiver was a two-step
process. First, the Court decided that, in enacting the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA), Congress intended to abrogate the sovereign immunity of state-owned common
carriers. Id. at 190. The Court then determined that, by operating an interstate railroad
after the enactment of FELA, Alabama necessarily consented to suit in federal court as
authorized by that Act. Id. at 192. In later cases, the Court held that Congress may induce
waiver of a state's sovereign immunity "only by making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
Eventually, Parden was explicitly overruled to the extent that it was inconsistent with this
clear statement requirement. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
133. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47 (refusing to find a state's consent to federal
suit by its participation in a federal program funded under a statute).
134. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 475-76 (requiring a clear statement to abrogate).
135. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
136. Id. at 182 ("Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore,
the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state
officials.").
137. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995) (5-4 decision) (holding uncon-
stitutional, as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause powers, a particular federal law prohib-
iting firearms within specified distances of state schools).
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themselves. Often Congress possesses other tools to reach a regula-
tory result by taxing and offering money to the states to induce their
cooperation. So, for example, if Congress could not prohibit guns
near schools (Lopez), it almost certainly, under existing law, could
raise taxes and offer the money back to the states so long as they pro-
hibited guns near schools.'" 8 Like the pressure in a champagne bottle
with a weak cork, pressures for federal regulation will take the path of
least resistance. Unless corresponding limits are placed on spending
powers, any federal impulse to control a specific matter will be
achieved through Congress's spending powers.
From a states' rights point of view, such incentives are similar to
bribes, but particularly odious bribes paid with money originally sto-
len from the victim. Consequently, I expect an attack from these
quarters on the liberal Spending Clause cases like South Dakota v.
Do 39 in an attempt to seal hermetically federal spending power
within limits analogous to the limits on Congress's direct regulatory
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause.14 The objective is
likely to be a convergence of Commerce Clause and Spending Clause
limits by reading the Constitution to prohibit congressional control of
regulatory outcomes through conditional federal spending that could
not be controlled through direct regulation.' 4 ' The arguments are
difficult to articulate fully, but they will be forcefully made, absent a
drastic change in the Court's composition.
This struggle could have implications for state sovereign immu-
nity cases; indeed, it could partially develop in such cases. It is not
difficult to imagine the Court developing a stricter scrutiny for federal
statutes that offer states participation in a federally funded program
on the condition that they waive their immunity from federal suits
brought to enforce the requirements of the program.
138. Cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1987) (allowing Congress much
greater latitude to regulate indirectly by attaching conditions to grants, rather than to reg-
ulate directly under the Commerce Clause).
139. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
140. Justice Brennan's dissent in Dole, for example, reasoned that Congress cannot con-
dition a federal grant in a manner that abridges a power reserved to the states. Id. at 212
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole focused on the limits imposed by the Spending
Clause. She reasoned that there are four separate limitations on the spending powers: (1)
the expenditure must be for the general welfare; (2) the conditions must be unambiguous;
(3) they must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure; and (4) the legisla-
tion must not violate any constitutional prohibition. Id. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
She believed that the restriction at issue in Dole-that states raise the drinking age to
twenty-one-was not sufficiently related to the purpose of the legislation to which it was
attached-namely, funding for interstate highways-and that it infringed on the rights
granted to the states by the Twenty-First Amendment. Id. at 213-18.
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C. The Significance of the Seminole Majority's View of the Ex parte
Young Doctrine
1. The Ex parte Young Doctrine.-The second part of Seminole
concerns a doctrine identified with Ex parte Young,14 2 although long
antedating it. 4 ' In Ex parte Young, the Court permitted an injunctive
suit brought by a private party against a state officer to force the of-
ficer prospectively to comply with the Constitution. 44 Had the state
been a named party, the Eleventh Amendment would have barred the
suit.145 It would also have been barred if the plaintiff had sought dam-
ages from the state treasury, even though the officer and not the state
was the party-defendant.' 46 Ex parte Young found state sovereign im-
munity no bar to a limited class of federal suits-those seeking to
compel state officers prospectively to adhere to federal law.'47 It did
so by indulging in the fiction that the suit was not against the state.148
The fictitious nature of Ex parte Young is clear beyond question. It
permits a federal court to stop a state officer from following the clear
commands of state legislation.149 Because most legislation is not self-
executing, state policy often can be realized only by executive enforce-
ment. Ex parte Young permits federal courts to interfere with acts of
state government. Those courts may do so not just to enforce conven-
tional Federal Bill of Rights provisions. Cases after Ex parte Young, and
language in that case,1"' indicate that the fiction extended to permit
suits seeking to stop state officers from violating federal statutes."'
142. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
143. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824) (hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment applies only to cases in which a state is a named party).
For a discussion of early cases, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150-56. For additional cases,
see 13 CENTURY EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DicEsT, Courts § 844.5, at 2571-75 (1899).
144. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56 ("[1]ndividuals who, as officers of the state . ..
threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to
enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution,
may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.").
145. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 857; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150-51
(discussing the "party of record" rule); FALLON ET L., supra note 4, at 1063-65 (citing cases
and discussing the same rule).
146. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (5-4 decision).
147. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56.
148. Id. at 159-66; see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
149. This was true in Ex parte Young itself, in which a federal injunction was sought
against the state attorney general's enforcement of a state statute. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
at 149, 159-60.
150. Id. at 167 (stating such a suit "is no new invention").
151. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 n.17 (1996) (5-4 decision)
(recognizing that private suits seeking injunctions to enforce statutory causes of action can
be asserted against state officials under the doctrine of Ex parte Young); Ray v. Atlantic
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Ex parte Young has been viewed as necessary for a healthy judicial
federalism. 152 Without it, the enforcement of federal rights, and par-
ticularly the Fourteenth Amendment for much of its history, would
have been severely limited. Absent Ex parte Young, enforcement would
be possible in three ways. First, those whose federal rights are violated
in state judicial actions can interpose federal defenses in the state
court, with such federal review as the certiorari and habeas corpus
statutes permit.153 Second, those wishing to assert federal rights as
plaintiffs presumably can enforce them in state courts, with the possi-
bility (remote in modern times) of review in the Supreme Court.'
Third, federal officers can enforce federal rights in federal court.151
Difficulties exist with all three of these alternatives to Ex parte Young
suits. Even Justice Scalia, a devotee of state interests in the struggles
over judicial federalism, has cited Ex parte Young injunctions as legiti-
mate, and as a method of reconciling state sovereign immunity with
valid federal limitations on how states may treat individuals.' 56
2. The Portion of Seminole Concerning Ex parte Young.-Having
concluded that the state could not be made a party to the suit in Semi-
nole by abrogation, 57 the Court considered whether the suit could
proceed as an Ex parte Young suit to force the Governor of Florida into
prospective compliance with the Gaming Act's requirement of good-
faith negotiation with the Tribe.158 The basis of the Court's conclu-
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 155, 156 n.6 (1978) (affirming that suits against state officials
may be brought in federal court to enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional state laws).
152. Even the majority in Seminole recognizes Ex parte Young suits as one important way
of realizing the Supremacy Clause's goal. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.14, 1132 n.16; see
also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring and dis-
senting), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4 decision).
153. The Supremacy Clause requires state courts to give effect to defenses of federal law.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
154. The Supremacy Clause requires state judges to enforce federal law. Id.; see Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1947) (unanimous decision) (affirming that state courts cannot
ignore federal laws).
155. The Eleventh Amendment is no barrier to suits by the United States government.
Thus, where federal rights provisions for individual rights nevertheless allow the federal
government to bring suit to enforce them, the Eleventh Amendment is no obstacle. See
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (permitting a United States Attor-
ney General's suit against a state to enforce the federal voting rights of African Americans);
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity,
73 TEX. L. REV. 539 (1995).
156. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Of course federal
law can give, and has given, the private suitor many means short of actions against the State
to assure compliance with federal law. He may obtain a federal injunction against the state
officer, which will effectively stop the unlawful action, see Ex parte Young.. .
157. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
158. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996) (5-4 decision).
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sion that the suit could not proceed is difficult to understand. 159 Cer-
tainly, the Court did not repudiate Ex parte Young, and it showed no
sign of doing so even as to federal statutory claims against state of-
ficers. Indeed, if that doctrine is viewed as exempting from immunity
any otherwise proper suit to compel a state officer to comply with fed-
eral law, then one could say that the Ex parte Young doctrine itself was
not limited at all. Rather, one might read Seminole as finding an Ex
parte Young suit unavailable because of the lack of a cause of action-a
prerequisite to any suit in federal court.'6 ° The Court concluded that
Congress, in creating the Gaming Act, intended that there be no in-
junctive remedy against state officers.' 6 1 Viewed this way, the Tribe
lost for the simplest of reasons-failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. At one point, the Court stated:
Contrary to the claims of the dissent, we do not hold that
Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex pane
Young over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme.
We find only that Congress did not intend that result in the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Although one might argue
that the text of [the Gaming Act], taken alone, is broad
enough to encompass both a suit against a State (under an
abrogation theory) and a suit against a state official (under
an Ex parte Young theory), subsection (A) (i) of [the Act] can-
not be read in isolation from subsections (B) (ii)-(vii), which
repeatedly refers exclusively to "the State."' 16 2
The implications of this reading are minor for plaintiffs asserting
federal constitutional rights, because congressional intent to restrict
remedies rarely will stop an action to force state officers to comply
with the Constitution. 6 ' For plaintiffs seeking federal court enforce-
159. The Court reasoned that Congress had specified a detailed remedial scheme in
case of violation of the statute. Id. By so doing, Congress indicated its intent to exclude
the broader remedies allowed by Ex parte Young. Id. This remained true even after the
specific remedy was held to be unconstitutional. Id.
160. The principle that a court cannot grant relief without a cause of action-a legal
rule of which the plaintiff is a beneficiary or authorized enforcer-is basic to our system of
laws. It leaves its traces in rules such as Fed. I Civ. P. 12(b) (6) providing for federal courts
to dismiss lawsuits brought by those with no legal claim to relief. In Seminole, the Gaming
Act was the sole asserted source of plaintiffs' right to an injunction. If the Gaming Act was
read as not creating a cause of action in favor of the Tribe, therefore, the latter's suit could
not be maintained.
161. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
162. Id. at 1133 n.17.
163. But see Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975). Monaghan argues that some of the Supreme
Court's Constitution-based decisions stem from a legitimate choice that the Constitution
gives the Court regarding remedies for violations of specified rights. For example, both
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ment of federal statutory rights against states, the decision is potentially
of much more importance, even on the limited "failure-to-state-a-
cause-of-action" reading of Seminole. The importance is submerged
because, on the surface, it is not surprising that when Congress creates
a new right, Congress should be substantially in charge of the reme-
dies for its denial. Although there are exceptions even to this proposi-
tion,16 4 surely if Congress intends that there not be an injunctive
remedy for the violation of a new statutory duty, normally Congress
should be able to enact that policy.165 On this reading, the troubling
aspect of Seminole is not that the majority enforced a clear congres-
sional policy against private injunctive relief under a particular statute.
It is, rather, that the congressional intent to rule out injunctive relief
in the Gaming Act was far from clear (indeed, any intent was probably
to the contrary), and that the Court performed contortions to read a
policy excluding injunctions into the statute. Particularly troubling is
what those contortions may portend for future Ex parte Young suits
brought to enforce federal statutes.
Despite its recognition that Congress had attempted (in its view,
unconstitutionally) to subject the states to federal coercive action to
compel negotiations, the majority refused to conclude that an Ex parte
Young suit was a lesser included remedy.166 Generally, suits against
state officers have been permitted to enforce federal statutory obliga-
tions that in the literal terms of the statute are obligations of the state
itself. Indeed, that is the whole point of Ex parte Young suits.16 7 The
Court, however, offered two arguments suggesting that Seminole differs
from such suits. First, the Court placed some emphasis on the fact
the Court-imposed Miranda warnings and the exclusionary rule may reflect the Court's
choice of remedies for violations of the relevant Fourth Amendment lights, a choice possi-
bly subject to congressional displacement by statute providing an alternative and accepta-
bly effective remedy. Id. at 18-20.
164. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In that case, the
Court rejected the State's argument that the state legislature may specify the procedures
for deprivation of a property right created by state statute, stating that "[t]he right to due
process 'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest ... it may not constitutionally au-
thorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate proce-
dural safeguards.'" Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part)).
165. If, under the circumstances of a case, the statute created a vested constitutional
right (e.g., granted federal land), then Congress's power to deny relief might become con-
troversial. See supra note 160.
166. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
167. See, e.g., Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974) (noting that, while injunc-
tions against state officers have obvious fiscal consequences for the state, such expense is
an inevitable effect of Ex parte Young's permissible purpose).
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that the express federal cause of action created by the Gaming Act-
the one ruled unconstitutional-was against the state and not its of-
ficers. 168 The Court suggested that the creation of one express rem-
edy in the Gaming Act was a strong indication that Congress intended
no other remedies.169 This seems wrong. In the 1988 (pre-Union Gas)
world of the Gaming Act, Ex parte Young suits were the background
norm, and abrogation under the Commerce Clause was unusual-ar-
guably unconstitutional-and required express language if it was per-
mitted at all. Thus, an attempt at an accurate reading of Congress's
intent suggests that the remedy against the state was made express in
order to augment, rather than supplant, the usual injunctive remedy
against state officers. It is hard to believe that Congress would not
have intended that the usual Ex parte Young suit against an officer be
available in the event that state immunity be held to preclude any
remedy against the state.
The Seminole Court's second argument requires more thought,
but it too ultimately fails. Here the emphasis was not on the fact that
the only express remedy ran against the state itself, but on what the
majority suggested was the carefully crafted and limited nature of that
remedy.17 ° The Court analogized Seminole to Schweiker v. Chilicky,171 a
case in which the Court refused to imply a damage remedy for consti-
tutional violations, reasoning that Congress had supplied a carefully
crafted, limited, yet adequate, remedy.172 As in Chilicky, the Seminole
168. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33 & n.17.
169. The Court noted that the limited remedy provided in § 2710(d) (7) of the Gaming
Act-a court order directing good-faith negotiations-was contrary to any possible con-
gressional intent to expose state officers to the "full remedial powers" of an Ex parte Young
suit. Id. at 1132-33.
170. Id. The Court's logic was similar to that employed in cases brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) in which the Court has concluded that a specific and carefully crafted
set of remedies should be seen as supplanting a more general source of rights. Section
1983 purports to provide remedies for state violations of federal constitutional and statutory
rights. The issue has been whether § 1983's damage remedy is available for violations of
statutes that have no similar provision for damages. This question became particularly
acute after the Court became less willing to imply private damage remedies under statutes
that made no mention of them. Section 1983 offered a way around these rulings, if inter-
preted as expressly augmenting the remedies of federal statutes that were silent on the
damages issue. In several cases, the Court found that carefully crafted statutory schemes
were, for that reason, intended to stand alone, unaugmented by § 1983-that is, the Court
believed there was reason to find that Congress deliberately opted out of § 1983's um-
brella. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981) (finding § 1983 relief precluded by a statute establishing specific rem-
edies unavailable to individual plaintiffs and refusing to imply additional remedies as
causes of action).
171. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
172. Id. at 423.
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Court concluded that the nature of the express remedial scheme in
the Gaming Act counseled similar restraint.
1 73
What was it about the Gaming Act that suggested that no Ex parte
Young injunction should be available? Apparently it was the fact that
the only express remedy Congress provided against the states for fail-
ure to negotiate with a tribe was mediation, in which the state was
under no enforceable obligation to participate. (Its failure to do so,
however, might result in federal preemption of the state's powers to
regulate the tribe's activities.) 174 In the Court's view, an Exparte Young
injunction would be much harsher, exposing state officers, particu-
larly governors, to the possibility of a contempt order. 175
There are many difficulties with this analysis. First, it is unclear
that Congress did not intend for federal courts to use contempt when
faced with a blatant violation of its order compelling a state to negoti-
ate in good faith. Surely the availability of an injunction is to be the
usual and reasonable assumption with respect to state officers' wilful
refusal to follow federal judicial commands directed to the state.176
Indeed, as Justice Stevens suggests, if the federal court's order requir-
ing a state (or its officer) to negotiate was not ultimately enforceable
by contempt, then the court's order requiring negotiation would
seem advisory and, thus, a violation of Article 111.177 This further sug-
gests a reading of the Gaming Act that permits the usual contempt
sanction for extreme cases, but which presumably is to be applied with
the utmost regard for states' rights in cases in which the relief sought
is equitable.
The best reason for the denial of injunctive relief in Seminole
would build upon the constitutionally troubling nature of the specific
173. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1133. The Court reasoned that, if Exparte Young actions were allowed under
the original statute, Indian tribes would have no incentive to "suffer through the intricate
scheme" of the Gaming Act. Id.
176. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978) ("In exercising their prospective
powers under Ex parte Young and Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts are not reduced to issu-
ing injunctions against state officers and hoping for compliance. Once issued, an injunc-
tion may be enforced."). In Hutto, the Court implied that both criminal and civil contempt
proceedings against state officials are proper to enforce an Ex parte Young order. Id. at 690-
91. Ex parte Young itself was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a state official
who had been held in contempt for disobeying a federal court injunction. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 126-34 (1908) (statement of the case). Thus, contempt sanctions were the
natural and expected consequence for violation of an Ex parte Young injunction when Con-
gress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
177. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority opin-
ion as possibly advisory, given judicial involvement in intermediate stages of a procedure
beginning and ending in the executive branch).
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obligation sought to be enforced against the state. The Gaming Act
may be a special case in which enforcement with an injunction would
be inappropriate. If so, contrary to the suggestion in Seminole, the
plausible reasons for this conclusion are not expandable to cover
every case involving a specially crafted alternative set of remedies. If
an injunction was inappropriate in Seminole, the reasons stem from
truly unusual aspects of the Gaming Act, which imposed on the state
(or its officers) a duty to negotiate the content of state law, as opposed
to a duty to follow preemptive federal law. 178 If an express congres-
sional command that a state negotiate the content of state regulation
violates the Tenth Amendment, then, of course, an Ex parte Young suit
seeking that relief would do so as well. Such a conclusion would have
been a narrow, and more acceptable, reason for excluding the Tribe's
Ex parte Young suit, if it sought such an order enforceable by contempt
sanctions.
In New York v. United States,179 a majority, essentially coextensive
with that of Seminole, struck down a federal law passed under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause as violating New York's Tenth Amendment
immunity from legislation invading its basic sovereignty.1 8° The vice
in the statute was its requirement that a state legislature enact, as state
law, a specified federal policy."' 1 Although differences exist between
these two cases, there is also kinship between the law in New York v.
United States and the Gaming Act that held center stage in Seminole.
The law at issue in Seminole pressures a state, whose policy is absolutely
to the contrary, either to change its mind as to what state law will be or
to go through the charade of negotiation. New York v. United States
makes clear that Congress cannot force the former result; the Tenth
Amendment also plausibly forbids requiring an unwilling state, and
particularly its governor, to do the latter. Indeed, the notion of nego-
tiation in good faith seems to entail the requirement that a state tem-
porarily abandon its stated policy decision against a compact so as to
be flexible. Thus, Congress can often preempt, imposing substantive
requirements on the states, but it is not clear that it can pressure states
to negotiate the content of state law when they wish not to do so.
Although the Seminole Court may have been concerned about
these aspects of the Gaming Act, it regarded these issues as not offi-
cially before it.1 82 Even assuming the Court could not have directly
178. Id.; see also supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
179. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
180. Id. at 166, 177.
181. Id. at 159-66.
182. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126 n.10.
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considered these arguments,'83 they could have been made indirectly
dispositive. Assuming that Congress can expressly require a state to
negotiate, special Tenth Amendment concerns might have been made
the reason that an Ex parte Young suit was not available to coerce a
state to comply with federal law. The Court could have stated that,
even if constitutionally possible, such an arrangement is a drastic in-
trusion into states' rights, and the usual willingness to imply a right to
indirect enforcement against state officers- is inappropriate. 84 Per-
haps Seminole can be limited in this way as a clear statement rule for
certain Ex parte Young suits posing unusually serious threats to federal-
ism. The Seminole Court, however, never suggests this rationale or the
limits it would impose. As it stands, Seminole is more general, prohibit-
ing indirect relief against state officers even though such relief does
not raise serious Tenth Amendment questions
In short, Seminole's limiting effect on Ex parte Young suits appar-
ently is not confined to those that raise Tenth Amendment concerns.
Rather, it extends to at least some suits that are aimed merely at re-
quiring state officers to comply with indisputably valid federal statutes.
What does Seminole portend for such suits? At least in statutory cases,
Seminole may be the first step toward a narrower view of the availability
of federal court injunctions to enforce federal statutory rights against
the states. Either as to all such cases generally, or as to subsets, a ma-
jority of the Court may begin to scrutinize statutes for evidence of
Congress's intent that the statutory rights it created against the states
not be enforceable by injunctions. Because the course of Supreme
Court appointments is extremely difficult to predict, a miserly ap-
proach to Ex parte Young injunctions may develop and possibly inten-
sify over the next several years. 185 One might even imagine Seminole
developing into a federal statutory jurisprudence requiring clear statu-
183. The Court has on occasion raised similar constitutional objections, neither briefed,
nor even raised, below. A major issue of federalism was decided by the Court on its own
initiative in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It was whether to overrule
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which had concluded that the grant of diversity
jurisdiction often justified federal courts in making and applying a general federal com-
mon law, rather than state law, to issues that would have been determined by state law in
state court suits. Justice Butler's dissent in Erie, rejecting the overruling of Swift, makes
clear that the issue was not placed before the Supreme Court by the parties. Erie, 304 U.S.
at 81-88 (Butler, J., dissenting).
184. Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (establishing a presumption
against reading a statute to encroach on essential political functions of states, even if con-
stitutionally permissible, and requiring a plain statement in the statute in order to accom-
plish such a result).
185. See, e.g., Al Kamen, Withholding Judges, WASH. Pos-r, Mar. 28, 1997, at A27, available
in 1997 WL 10009665 (indicating that the President may well have trouble getting judicial
appointments confirmed, especially important ones).
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tory permission as a prerequisite to an Ex parte Young suit. Because of
its context, there is a particularly troubling passage in the opinion of
the Seminole Court, which could be read as requiring some sort of af-
firmative congressional "authorization" to procure an injunction
against state officers who violate federal statutory rights: "Contrary to
the claims of the dissent, we do not hold that Congress cannot authorize
federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young over a cause of action with a
limited remedial scheme. We find only that Congress did not intend
that result in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act." ' 6
The passage would not have caught my eye, except that it appears
in an opinion straining to find evidence that Congress intended to
exclude Ex parte Young relief under the Gaming Act.187 There are a
variety of ways to read the passage, some quite benign and limited to
circumstances in which an apparently comprehensive set of remedies
is created by the statute itself. Moreover, of course, the authorization
to which the Court refers might include the implied and the express
varieties. Still, one wonders whether, in a later opinion, the Court
might build on these statements to hold that some express or very
clear (even if implied) congressional authorization is a necessary pre-
requisite to any Ex parte Young suit brought to enforce federal statu-
tory rights.
Such a holding would be the reverse of a reasonable jurispru-
dence of remedies for state action violating an individual's federal
statutory rights. The default assumption should be that any party pos-
sessing a primary statutory right, who meets the tests of equity, can
procure an injunction to enforce federal law, even in cases in which
the defendant is a state officer.
Against this view, some arguments could be made, but they are
not very persuasive. First, some might argue that the Supreme Court
cases limiting judicial implication of causes of action are contrary to
this view."8 8 These cases are better read, however, as prohibiting the
186. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 n.17 (emphasis added).
187. See supra notes 157-184 and accompanying text.
188. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court stated:
As our recent cases-particularly Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 [(1975)] demonstrate,
the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not
automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person. Instead,
before concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy available to a special
class of litigants, a court must carefully analyze the four factors that Cort identifies
as indicative of such an intent.
Id. at 688. Cort and Cannon are widely seen as supplanting an earlier judicial willingness to
recognize private rights of action under statutes that, on their surface, provide only for
enforcement by organs of government, an approach exemplified by J.L Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), a unanimous decision, in which the Court upheld a private party's
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courts from recognizing any rights in those who Congress did not in-
tend to be beneficiaries of a particular statute, rather than as limiting
the courts' power to fashion remedies for those found to be congres-
sionally intended beneficiaries."8 9 Even if the anti-implied cause of
action cases are read as limiting the courts' choice of remedies for
those who are properly found to be statutory rights holders, those
cases seem to be largely confined to prohibiting the remedy of dam-
ages when not contemplated by Congress."' 0
Some of the confusion in the cases and commentary may stem
from a view that some federal statutory rights are, by their very nature,
negative and not affirmative. This is the view in which some rights can
be used as defenses to court actions brought against the holder of a
federal right as defendant, but cannot be used by the holder as a
plaintiff seeking legal or equitable relief. Occasionally, federal statu-
tory rights, expressed as preemption claims against state action, have
been viewed this way.' 9 ' This paradigm of negative versus affirmative
rights is wrong.'92 Instead, any federal right that can be used nega-
right to sue under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 430-31; see FALLON
ET AL., supra note 4, at 839-40.
189. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) ("The general
rule, therefore, is that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought
pursuant to a federal statute."). One might argue that this view requires more than just a
plaintiff with a federal right (which might be assertable solely as a defense), but rather a
plaintiff with a cause of action. Such arguments are unsound, particularly as to claims for
equitable relief. See infra notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
190. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 844 & n.11 (suggesting that private access to
injunctive relief may be more readily inferable than access to a remedy for damages). Cort
seems particularly concerned with limiting the Court's powers to infer a cause of action for
damages. See 422 U.S. at 79-80 (noting that the criminal statute at issue had no indication
that civil enforcement was available to anyone). Other cases have readily inferred that
access to equitable relief (when equitable requirements are met) inheres in the possession
of a federal statutory defense to judicial actions brought under state law. See, e.g., Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979); see also infra note 195
and accompanying text.
191. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 233, 237-39 (1991).
192. Cases such as Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), and
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), and some academic literature on
them have created a misimpression. See Monaghan, supra note 191, at 237-39 (citing Skelly
and Mottley in passages which suggest that the existence of a federal statutory right does not
necessarily entail the possibility of a federal cause of action for any affirmative relief, in-
cluding injunctions). In Mottley, a railroad had issued lifetime passes to the plaintiffs. Mot-
tley, 211 U.S. at 150. A later federal statute arguably sought to make such passes illegal. Id.
at 151. The Mottleys sued in federal court, under state contract law, to specifically enforce
their bargain. Id. at 150-51. In the plaintiffs' view, the fact that the railroad would almost
certainly raise the federal statute as a defense caused the case to come within the statute
granting federal trial courts jurisdiction over suits arising under the Constitution, treaties,
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tively as a defense can be used affirmatively in a suit for an injunction
or declaratory judgment as long as the tests of equitable need are met.
From this perspective, a right is not inherently negative or positive;
rather, the circumstances of the case in which it is asserted determine
whether equitable relief may be allowed or denied as unnecessary or
too burdensome.
1 93
There are three virtues to the view that the possibility of injunc-
tive relief inheres in a federal constitutional or statutory right. First, it
reduces the complexity of federal rights analysis (collapsing negative
and affirmative rights) except where Congress has mandated such a
and laws of the United States. Id. at 152. Although the lower courts proceeded with the
case, the Supreme Court ordered dismissal, holding that a case does not arise under fed-
eral law if that law does no more in the case than provide a defense. Id. It is crucial that the
Court had no occasion to determine whether the railroad might have used the federal
statute as the basis of an injunctive action in some other circumstances.
In Skelly, the Court determined that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not permit
federal jurisdiction over a suit that, absent the Act, would involve federal law only as a
defense. Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671-72. The Court clarified that the Declaratory Judgment Act
could not be used to circumvent cases like Mottley. Id. According to Skelly's logic, the
railroad in Mottley could not have procured a declaration of its statutory right against Mot-
tley, because in any other plausible suit between those two parties, those rights could have
been used only as a defense to state action. The reason that declaratory and injunctive
relief was unavailable was not that the railroad's right was inherently limited to defensive
use (it was not so limited), but rather, that any assertion of the railroad's rights in injunc-
tive form would have failed the equitable tests of reasonable need for relief. It is ludicrous
to believe the railroad could have obtained an injunction to stop the Mottleys from simply
presenting their passes to a conductor. Self help-refusal to honor the ticket-followed by
defense to any lawsuit brought against the railroad would be fully adequate to protect any
rights the latter possessed under the federal statute. In short, in the extremely unlikely
event that the railroad needed an injunction to protect its rights, nothing in Mottley or
Skelly indicates that an injunction or a declaratory judgment would have been unavailable.
The distinction between federal rights that merely create defenses to state court ac-
tions and those that will sustain an action in federal court is unnecessary. Absent some
indication of real congressional intent to limit remedies, there is no such a priori division of
cases. Statutes creating rights in individuals authorize equitable relief where necessary to
minimally acceptable enforcement. It is a case-by-case, or perhaps a category-by-category,
equitable determination whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy for violation of a
statute. Federal constitutional provisions are often found to create rights that can be as-
serted as either a defense, or affirmatively in an action for an injunction, depending, in the
latter case, on whether equitable requirements are met. SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
54-55 (1971) (finding that the First Amendment permits both defensive and injunctive
relief against state criminal proceedings contrary to its requirements, but that equitable
principles preclude the latter unless defending the state proceedings will produce irrepara-
ble harm). Even indulging in the assumption that it is more difficult to determine who has
a primary right under a statute than under a constitutional provision, there is no good
reason why statutory jurisprudence should be different in terms of providing minimally
adequate enforcement once a rights holder is identified.
193. Some rights may be practically, rather than inherently, negative, because of the
great likelihood that using them defensively will provide an adequate legal remedy. See
the discussion of Mottley and Skelly, supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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distinction. Second, this view seems as consistent with the unruly case
law as any other. For example, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis,19 4 once the Court determined that a private person had a
right to have a contract treated as void under federal law, the Court
easily found an implied right to equitable relief-rescission and resti-
tution-though not to damages, stating:
In the case of § 215 [of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940], we conclude that the statutory language itself fairly
implies a right to specific and limited relief in a federal
court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its terms
necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness under its
criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the very least Con-
gress must have assumed that § 215 could be raised defen-
sively in private litigation to preclude the enforcement of an
investment advisers contract. But the legal consequences of
voidness are typically not so limited.1 9 5
Likewise, the legal consequences of the voidness of preempted state
statutes or executive action have not been limited to negating court
actions brought against the rights holder. 9 6 Typically, when the
Court has denied injunctive relief on grounds that the plaintiff has no
194. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
195. Id. at 18.
196. My position is that a federal court has inherent remedial power to provide injunc-
tive relief or the lesser declaratory judgment remedy, unless Congress has specifically ex-
cluded such relief under a statute. Some have argued to the contrary that many rights are
negative only, see supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text, and that it is only the um-
brella provisions of § 1983 that convert such rights into rights to affirmative relief by
providing:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (emphasis added). Professor Monaghan takes this position, see-
ing § 1983 as crucial. See Monaghan, supra note 191, at 250-51 (arguing that often it is only
§ 1983 that provides a right to sue to those with a federal right). In my view, § 1983 is not
necessary, because the courts possess adequate inherent remedial power. See supra notes
191-192 and accompanying text. The courts have frequently allowed private parties injunc-
tive relief against preempted state laws without invoking § 1983. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd.
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20 n.20 (1983) (noting that
§ 502 (a) (3) of ERISA provides such a remedy); FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 844 & n. 11.
The Court may have settled this matter in favor of broad judicial remedial powers to pro-
tect federal-rights holders the year following Monaghan's article. See Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992), and particularly the quotation from it ap-
pearing in note 189, supra.
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cause of action under a statute, the Court's opinion indicates the
plaintiff is not a federal rights holder in any sense of those words. 19 7
Third, and most important, seeing potential injunctive relief as
an ordinary incident of a federal statutory right seems to put those
whom Congress intends to have federal rights in the position Con-
gress would want them to occupy. On occasion Congress might not
intend that a minimal federal rights holder-one who can assert a
defense under federal law-would also have a remedy for damages.
But the ordinary assumption should be that such a person could en-
join future violations of her rights when the right at issue is recog-
nized by a court, and the gravity and probability of harm from future
violations outweigh opposing equitable considerations, including
those of federalism.
This portrait of a federal court's remedial powers suggests that
Seminole would have matters backwards if it is read as ultimately requir-
ing specific statute-by-statute authorization (even implied authoriza-
tion) for Ex parte Young suits. It would be wrong because, once rights
are established, it should take a clear signal from Congress to stop the
courts from providing minimally adequate remedies for their realiza-
tion. Anything less than a presumption of meaningful enforcement
would be a regrettable tilting of the balance between the interests
favoring enforcement of federal law and those favoring states' rights-
a balance struck between Hans and Ex parte Young and maintained
over the following ninety years.
197. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1981). The Court stated:
Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondents have identified anything in
the legislative history suggesting that § 10 [of the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tion Act of 1899] was created for the especial benefit of a particular class. On the
contrary, the legislative history supports the view that the Act was designed to
benefit the public at large by empowering the Federal Government to exercise its
authority over interstate commerce with respect to obstructions on navigable riv-
ers caused by bridges and similar structures.
Id.; see also, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 457 (1974). In that case, the Court stated:
In light of the language and legislative history of § 307(a) [of the Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970], we read it as creating a public cause of action, maintainable
by the Attorney General, to enforce the duties and responsibilities imposed by the
Act. The only private cause of action created by that provision, however, is explic-
itly limited to "a case involving a labor agreement." Thus, no authority for the
action the respondent has brought can be found in the language of § 307(a).
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CONCLUSION
Seminoles position as to the breadth of Congress's abrogation
powers seems largely clear. None of Congress's powers under the
original Constitution carries with it the power to abrogate state immu-
nity. Almost equally clear is Congress's continuing authority to abro-
gate, using its powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and
probably using its powers to enforce the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. It would be good for American federalism if the Ex
parte Young portions of Seminole were read as simply stating an equita-
ble rule of refusing injunctions that skirt too close to Tenth Amend-
ment limits. In Seminole itself, a court order requiring the governor of
one of the United States to negotiate state policy seems problematic.
Indeed, if decided on this basis, Seminole's refusal of injunctive relief
seems correct. Seminole, however, offers no textual hint that it is so
limited. The reasons the Seminole Court gives for finding a congres-
sional "intent" to exclude injunctive enforcement of congressionally
created rights under the Gaming Act are so implausible as to suggest
that the Court may be willing in the future to find such exclusionary
intent in a variety of statutory schemes. Even worse, the implausibility
may indicate that such exclusionary "intent" is generated by some-
thing approaching a clear statement rule, requiring, as a prerequisite
to injunctive enforcement, some strong affirmative indication that
Congress contemplated such a remedy. This would turn on its head
the traditional and appropriate presumption that federal rights are to
be adequately enforced.
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